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RECONSIDERING THE SHAM AFFIDAVIT
DOCTRINE
COLLIN J. COX
INTRODUCTION
After the Second World War, Michael Dercacz, a Ukrainian,
applied for U.S. citizenship. In response to a question on the
naturalization application, Dercacz stated he had never committed a
crime of “moral turpitude,” an act which would have barred him from
obtaining citizenship. Since Dercacz appeared to meet all the
statutory requirements, his petition for naturalization was granted on
November 11, 1954.1
Yet while completing the application—and for almost thirty
subsequent years—Dercacz concealed from authorities that in 1941
he had voluntarily joined a Ukrainian police unit. This unit, which
eventually submitted to Nazi German control, persecuted and
murdered 2,000 Jewish Ukrainian citizens.2 After discovering this
information in 1982, the federal government brought a civil action in
federal district court under section 340(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 19523 to set aside Dercacz’s grant of naturalization.
In its complaint, the government alleged that Dercacz was ineligible
for naturalization because he had violated U.S. immigration law by
“assist[ing] the enemy in persecuting civil populations.”4
During a deposition, Dercacz admitted to having served as a
“uniformed, armed member of the Ukrainian police . . . during the
time of the virtual incarceration and subsequent extermination of the
Copyright © 2000 by Collin J. Cox.
1. See United States v. Dercacz, 530 F. Supp. 1348, 1349-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
2. See id.
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1994).
4. Dercacz, 530 F. Supp. at 1350.
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2,000 Jews.”5 He further acknowledged that his duties included
capturing Jews who refused to wear identifying armbands and
releasing to the Gestapo the names of Ukrainians who had aided
incarcerated Jews.6 On these admissions, the government moved for
summary judgment.7
Dercacz then submitted an affidavit in which he denied having
had “any contact or anything to do with the Jewish Ghetto or persons
generally in the . . . Police District,” a statement that contradicted his
deposition testimony.8 Despite his argument that the affidavit created
a genuine issue of fact warranting jury resolution, the federal district
court disregarded it as a “sham.” The court concluded that Dercacz’s
prior deposition admissions left no doubt that he had “assisted the
Nazis in persecuting civilian Jews.”9 Holding that no genuine issue of
material fact existed, the federal district judge granted summary
judgment to the government, revoking Dercacz’s citizenship.10
While the factual scenario of Dercacz is unique, the procedural
issue raised by the case is not. Federal and state courts have
encountered numerous comparable situations, in which litigants
responding to summary judgment motions have contradicted prior
deposition testimony in subsequent affidavits.11 The rules of civil
procedure in the federal and state systems do not specify how courts
should treat such affidavits. Nevertheless, as in Dercacz, federal and
state judges have often disregarded “offsetting affidavits,”12 generally
citing the “sham affidavit doctrine” for authority. This doctrine
derives originally from the Second Circuit’s 1969 decision, Perma
Research & Development Co. v. Singer Co.13 Subsequent courts ruling
on summary judgment motions have often relied on Perma Research
to disregard offsetting affidavits.14
5. Id.
6. See id. at 1351.
7. See id.
8. Id. at 1350.
9. Id. at 1351.
10. See id. at 1353.
11. See infra Part I.B-C.
12. For the purposes of this Note, I will refer to affidavits that are submitted in response to
motions for summary judgment and contradict prior deposition testimony as “offsetting
affidavits.” Although this term has its shortcomings, the alternative, “contradictory affidavits,”
incorrectly implies the existence of two independent affidavits.
13. 410 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1969).
14. See infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
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Yet some situations involving offsetting affidavits remain highly
questionable. In cases such as Dercacz, where the contradiction is
both unqualified and unexplained, an offsetting affidavit can, indeed,
appear a mere sham.15 Not every court has applied the doctrine in a
mechanical manner, however, either because the alleged
contradiction is less clear or because the court believes the affiant’s
explanation for the contradiction. In recent years, splits of authority
regarding the sham affidavit doctrine have emerged, both between
federal courts of appeals and between state courts. For example,
while the Second Circuit presumes that an offsetting affidavit
contradicting previous deposition testimony is a sham,16 the Fifth
Circuit generally considers the contexts in which offsetting affidavits
are submitted.17
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
propriety of the sham affidavit doctrine. Nevertheless, some lower
federal courts have argued that the doctrine is justified as a
manifestation of the trial judge’s inherent powers.18 Other lower
federal courts, however, have argued that when applied to certain
offsetting affidavits, the doctrine encroaches on the jury’s factfinding
domain.19 These arguments have carried more weight in some state
courts, where reaction to the sham affidavit doctrine has differed
15. See United States v. Dercacz, 530 F. Supp. 1348, 1350-51 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); see also
Jones v. General Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 384-85 (6th Cir. 1991) (ignoring an offsetting
affidavit when the plaintiff had denied the assertion made in the affidavit ten times during a
previous deposition); Schuyler v. United States, 987 F. Supp. 835, 839-41 (S.D. Cal. 1997)
(discrediting an affiant’s attempt to “back pedal” his own deposition representations regarding
the site of his injury); Selsor v. Callaghan & Co., 609 F. Supp. 1003, 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(rejecting an offsetting affidavit on the basis that the conflict with prior deposition testimony
was patently incredible).
16. See, e.g., Margo v. Weiss, 213 F.3d 55, 60-61 (2d Cir. 2000) (refusing to allow the
plaintiffs to “defeat a motion for summary judgment by responding with affidavits recanting
that earlier testimony”); Hayes v. New York City Dep’t of Corrections, 84 F.3d 614, 619 (2d Cir.
1996) (holding that “factual issues created solely by an affidavit crafted to oppose a summary
judgment motion are not ‘genuine’ issues for trial”); Mack v. United States, 814 F.2d 120, 124
(2d Cir. 1987) (“It is well settled in this circuit that a party’s affidavit which contradicts his own
prior testimony should be disregarded on a motion for summary judgment.”). But see Thomas v.
Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 1999) (allowing an affiant who had made “vague and
inconclusive” statements regarding a knife to clarify those statements in a subsequent
deposition).
17. See, e.g., Kennett-Murray v. Bone, 622 F.2d 887, 893-94 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that an
affidavit created a genuine issue of fact because it merely explained an alleged inconsistency
already existing in a deposition).
18. See infra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
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somewhat. State trial judges have appeared generally more receptive
to litigants’ explanations for contradictions, with some even rejecting
the Perma Research doctrine outright.
The scholarly literature is replete with sophisticated critiques of
summary judgment procedure,20 but there are few studies of the sham
affidavit doctrine, and no source compiles reactions to the doctrine in
state courts. Some authors have, however, identified the recent
divisions among certain federal circuits.21 One has noted the
continuing relevance of the sham affidavit doctrine in most
jurisdictions.22 Another article has acknowledged that the doctrine has
been used with increasing frequency in recent years.23 Some
commentators have even criticized the doctrinal foundations of the
sham affidavit doctrine, arguing that it can violate the central tenet
that judges should not determine issues of fact.24
20. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in
Civil Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955, 988 (1998) (“Unfortunately, the Federal Rules’ central
issue-narrowing mechanism—summary judgment under Rule 56—has proved to be inadequate.
In most civil suits summary judgment is unavailable to narrow disputed issues. Legal standards
have evolved to make summary judgment more difficult than the drafters may have
envisioned . . . .”). Judge Patricia M. Wald of the District of Columbia Circuit has commented:
I believe our circuit’s experience shows that we are now at a stage where the focus
should be on ensuring that summary judgment stays within its proper boundaries,
rather than on encouraging its unimpeded growth. Its expansion across subject matter
boundaries and its frequent conversion from a careful calculus of factual disputes (or
the lack thereof) to something more like a gestalt verdict based on an early snapshot
of the case have turned it into a potential juggernaut which, if not carefully
monitored, could threaten the relatively small residue of civil trials that remain.
Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1917 (1998).
21. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Summary Judgment Materials, 147 F.R.D. 647, 664-69 (1993)
(recognizing the split between circuits that apply the sham affidavit doctrine and those that do
not); Jeffrey L. Freeman, Annotation, Propriety, Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, of Granting Summary Judgment When Deponent Contradicts in Affidavit Earlier
Admission of Fact in Deposition, 131 A.L.R. FED. 403, 413-19 (1996) (itemizing the circuits and
particular cases in which the sham affidavit doctrine was or was not applied).
22. See Darrell S. Gay, The Importance of Summary Judgment in Defending Civil Rights
Cases, in LITIGATING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 65, 96 (PLI Litigation Course
Handbook Series, 1996):
In light of the anti-sham rule, it is important for defense counsel to uncover any and
all prior sworn testimony or statements made by either a party or a witness who will
testify at a deposition. . . . [D]eposition testimony must be consistent with any
statements made in a later affidavit in support of a motion for summary judgment. If
later sworn testimony conflicts with earlier testimony on a material issue of fact, the
court will consider the later testimony a “sham,” unless it falls within one of the
exceptions to the rule.
23. See Randall R. Riggs & Nelson D. Alexander, Dilemma of Conflicting Sworn
Testimony in Summary Judgment, 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 461, 469 (1994).
24. See, e.g., James Joseph Duane, The Four Greatest Myths About Summary Judgment, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1523, 1595-1611 (1995) (arguing that a judge can handle offsetting
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Though some form of the sham affidavit doctrine has been
endorsed in every federal court of appeals that has considered it, its
justifications have received scant attention in legal journals. This Note
attempts to fill that void, arguing that, while rigidly applying the
doctrine to disregard all offsetting affidavits is unjustifiable, the
fundamental principle of the doctrine is consistent with the court’s
responsibility to allow only genuine issues of material fact to progress
to trial. The Note further contends that trial judges can—and
should—engage in affidavit-specific determinations to decide whether
an outstanding genuine issue requires jury resolution. In reaching this
conclusion, courts should accord respondents to summary judgment
motions all reasonable inferences. Yet this Note concludes that when
an offsetting affidavit flatly contradicts prior deposition testimony
without explanation, as in Dercacz, an inference of its credibility is
not reasonable, its disregard is warranted, and summary judgment is
justified.
Part I of this Note broadly traces the history of the sham affidavit
doctrine, considering Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the leading
federal cases in the area, and the divergent approaches to offsetting
affidavits adopted by state courts. Part II presents the basic
justification for the doctrine—that sham affidavits do not create
genuine issues of fact. Instead, sham affidavits represent spurious
attempts to survive motions for summary judgment. Part III then
considers two issues central to defining the proper scope of the
doctrine—the necessity of allowing certain excuses for contradiction
and the application of the rule to statements by nonparties. Part IV
offers two possible reforms that would clarify the sham affidavit
doctrine; ultimately, however, the Note offers a qualified
endorsement of the present approach to offsetting affidavits in most
federal and state jurisdictions.
I.  THE HISTORY OF THE SHAM AFFIDAVIT DOCTRINE
A. Rule 56
The chief reason for the indecision among federal courts
regarding some aspects of the sham affidavit doctrine is that the
affidavits without usurping the function of the jury); Michael Holley, Making Credibility
Determinations at Summary Judgment: How Judges Broaden Their Discretion While “Playing by
the Rules,” 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 865, 887-904 (1999) (contending that the sham affidavit
doctrine allows judges to make credibility determinations and exercise “forbidden discretion”).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not address situations involving
offsetting affidavits. Rule 56, which governs summary judgment in the
federal judicial system, allows courts to grant such motions only in
limited circumstances:
The [summary] judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.25
The plain language of this rule allows affidavits to be considered
in summary judgment motions, and affidavits are central to summary
judgment practice.26 Indeed, Rule 56(e) permits parties to oppose
summary judgment motions with affidavits that “set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”27 The original
version of Rule 56 empowered the court to require any affiant to be
present for examination or cross-examination,28 providing the trial
judge an opportunity to question the affiant about any contradictions
with prior testimony. Yet the only textual check on fraudulent
affidavits in the current version of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is Rule 56(g), which only shifts certain costs associated
with responding to such affidavits:
Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any
of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad
faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith
order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits
caused the other party to incur, including reasonable attorney’s fees,
and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of
contempt.29
While such sanctions can be severe, the rule does not prescribe
that district courts prohibit certain offsetting affidavits, leaving a large
gap in the Federal Rules. Nevertheless, trial judges have sometimes
mistaken the long line of cases precluding the consideration of sham
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
26. See 11 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.14[1][a] (3d ed.
2000).
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).
28. See Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity’s Conquest? Reflections on the Future of
Trial Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 725, 740 (1989).
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(g).
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affidavits for a prohibition found in Rule 56. A federal judge in
Kansas, for example, stated: “Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a party opposing a motion for summary judgment may not
attempt to create a sham fact issue to defeat the motion through the
submission of affidavits which conflict with earlier sworn
statements.”30 Yet the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
contain an express prohibition of offsetting affidavits; the sham
affidavit doctrine has derived instead from the courts.
B. Leading Federal Cases
Much of the lore surrounding the sham affidavit doctrine
originated with the Second Circuit’s decision in Perma Research &
Development Co. v. Singer Co.31 Perma Research developed an
automobile anti-skid braking device and licensed the patent rights to
Singer. After approximately eight months, Singer concluded that the
braking device was hopelessly defective and commenced a product
recall. Perma Research then sued for breach of contract, claiming that
Singer had committed fraud by signing a contract it never intended to
perform.32
Perma Research’s president, Frank A. Perrino, the key witness in
the litigation, endured four days of depositions, during which he could
not remember a single instance when Singer employees had acted in a
fraudulent manner.33 Based on this admission, Singer moved for
summary judgment.34 Perrino then filed an affidavit stating that a
Singer employee once told him Singer “never had any intention” of
performing the contract.35 This affidavit, Perma Research argued,
presented a triable issue of material fact, rendering summary
judgment inappropriate. The trial judge disagreed, disregarding the
offsetting affidavit and granting summary judgment to Singer.36
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that Perma
Research had failed to raise a genuine issue:
30. Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528, 1532 (D. Kan. 1990) (disregarding
the plaintiff’s affidavit as a sham, since his contrary previous deposition testimony was “clear
and unequivocal,” with “no indication of confusion or ambiguity”).
31. 410 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1969).
32. See id. at 573-74.
33. See id. at 577-78.
34. See id. at 574.
35. Id. at 577.
36. See id. at 576.
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If there is any dispute as to the material facts, it is only because of
inconsistent statements made by Perrino the deponent and Perrino
the affiant. . . . If a party who has been examined at length on
deposition could raise an issue of fact simply by submitting an
affidavit contradicting his own prior testimony, this would greatly
diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for
screening out sham issues of fact.37
The last four words of this excerpt have had a lasting impact.
Since 1969, several federal courts of appeals have endorsed the Perma
Research holding and its prohibition against “sham” affidavits. For
instance, in Radobenko v. Automated Equipment Corp.,38 the Ninth
Circuit upheld a grant of summary judgment against the plaintiff, who
had submitted an offsetting affidavit, concluding:
The very object of summary judgment is to separate real and
genuine issues from those that are formal or pretended, so that only
the former may subject the moving party to the burden of trial. Here
we are convinced that the issues of fact created by [the plaintiff] are
not issues which this Court could reasonably characterize as
genuine; rather, they are sham issues which should not subject the
defendants to the burden of a trial.39
Other federal courts have applied the Perma Research doctrine
to hold that when an offsetting affidavit contradicts prior deposition
testimony, the affidavit should be completely disregarded.40 These
courts, often declaring that a litigant herself cannot create a material
issue of fact with her previous statements, have sometimes appeared
so predisposed against offsetting affidavits that they have ignored
potentially mitigating factors. Many of these federal courts submit
that if litigants could, without penalty, offer affidavits that contradict
previous testimony, summary judgment would be eviscerated. Chief
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit has concluded, for
37. Id. at 578.
38. 520 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1975).
39. Id. at 544 (citations omitted).
40. See, e.g., Adams v. Greenwood, 10 F.3d 568, 572 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[A]n affidavit
denying what is established by one’s own evidence . . . does not preclude summary judgment.”);
Jones v. General Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 385 (6th Cir. 1991) (denying summary judgment
when an affidavit contradicted prior deposition testimony); Hartley v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc., 930
F. Supp. 349, 354 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (disregarding an affidavit that did not present “additional
factual propositions”); cf. Margo v. Weiss, 213 F.3d 55, 60-61 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying the Perma
Research principle to prohibit the filing of delayed errata sheets and supplemental answers to
interrogatories in an attempt to avoid summary judgment).
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example: “The concern in litigation . . . is that a party will first admit
no knowledge of a fact but will later come up with a specific
recollection that would override the earlier admission.”41
In one Illinois federal district court proceeding, the plaintiff
answered a deposition question in a manner that cast doubt on her
claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The
plaintiff, who suffered from chronic psoriasis, admitted to defense
counsel that because she could still “function in everyday-life
activities,” her condition had not physically “affected” her in that
sense.42 During redirect examination, however, the plaintiff recanted
her previous statement and claimed that her psoriasis physically
“affected” her in another way—namely, by “distort[ing] [her]
appearance.”43 When the defendant moved for summary judgment
based on the plaintiff’s first admission, the plaintiff submitted an
affidavit that again described the physical effects of her psoriasis.44
Although the court acknowledged that the revised answer “could
arguably support the notion that [the plaintiff] is disabled for ADA
purposes,”45 the court curtly dismissed the explanation and granted
summary judgment for the defendant,46 refusing to accord the plaintiff
the reasonable inference that acute psoriasis in fact changes one’s
appearance.
Although several federal courts have reached similar results,
holding that offsetting affidavits may never be considered in summary
judgment motions,47 the Perma Research court actually held that trial
judges must engage in two separate inquiries, first determining if a
contradiction exists and then determining whether the contradiction
is justified. Specifically, the court concluded that trial judges cannot
41. Buckner v. Sam’s Club, Inc., 75 F.3d 290, 292-93 (7th Cir. 1996) (refusing to allow the
plaintiff’s offsetting affidavit to preclude summary judgment, when the plaintiff had stated
during her deposition that she “did not know” what object in the defendant’s store had caused
her fall, then asserted in an offsetting affidavit that the object was a ladies’ watch, “one of the
few objects that could directly link [the defendant] with the accident”).
42. Gray v. Ameritech Corp., 937 F. Supp. 762, 768 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
43. Id.
44. See id. at 768-69.
45. Id. at 769.
46. The trial judge stated his refusal to “play ostrich . . . bur[ying] [his head] . . . in the
sand” by ignoring that the plaintiff “received some ‘education’” between the time of her
deposition and the time she submitted the offsetting affidavit. Id. at 769.
47. See, e.g., Jones v. General Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 385 (6th Cir. 1991) (“[I]t is well
settled that a plaintiff may not create a factual issue for the purpose of defeating a motion for
summary judgment by filing an affidavit contradicting a statement the plaintiff made in a prior
deposition.”).
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“exclude the [offsetting] affidavit[s] from consideration in the
determination of the question whether there is any genuine issue as to
any material fact”48 and acknowledged that “there may be some
instances where summary judgment is too blunt a procedural
device.”49 The Perma Research court found, however, that Mr.
Perrino’s depositions were so unambiguous that his offsetting
affidavit, which directly contradicted his previous testimony, did not
create a genuine issue of material fact.50
In more ambiguous situations, however, subsequent federal
courts have found it difficult to differentiate offsetting affidavits
creating genuine issues of material fact from those raising only sham
issues. While the Second Circuit has remained hostile to offsetting
affidavits,51 other circuits have endorsed more flexible approaches.
The Ninth Circuit has reminded its district judges that they must first
determine that an offsetting affidavit is a sham before declaring that
no genuine issue of fact exists.52 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has
described summary judgment as a “lethal weapon,” imploring courts
to be “mindful of its aims and targets” and to avoid “overkill in its
use.”53
Additionally, another long line of federal cases undercuts the
Perma Research rationale by holding that district courts cannot
resolve factual disputes by weighing conflicting evidence,54 because
they are “not authorized to resolve issues of fact on a motion for
summary judgment.”55 The Fifth Circuit, for example, has declared
that “[c]redibility assessments are not fit grist for the summary
48. Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 578 (2d Cir. 1969).
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
52. See Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1991).
53. Brunswick Corp. v. Vineberg, 370 F.2d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 1967); see also Whitaker v.
Coleman, 115 F.2d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1940):
Summary judgment procedure is not a catch penny contrivance to take unwary
litigants into its toils and deprive them of a trial, it is a liberal measure, liberally
designed for arriving at the truth. Its purpose is not to cut litigants off from their right
of trial by jury if they really have evidence which they will offer on a trial, it is to
carefully test this out, in advance of trial by inquiring and determining whether such
evidence exists. Rule 56 is carefully drawn to effectuate this purpose.
54. See, e.g., Farbwerke Hoeschst A. G. v. M/V “Don Nicky,” 589 F.2d 795, 798 (5th Cir.
1979) (“[T]he court may not weigh conflicting affidavits to resolve disputed fact issues.”); Frito-
Lay, Inc. v. Morton Foods, Inc., 316 F.2d 298, 301 (10th Cir. 1963) (holding that a comparison of
conflicting testimony “cannot conclusively negative the likelihood of confusion as a matter of
law”).
55. Choudhry v. Jenkins, 559 F.2d 1085, 1089 (7th Cir. 1977).
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judgment mill.”56 Several of these federal courts have concluded that
only juries may assess the comparative value of disputed evidence or
choose between conflicting versions of the same events.57
Yet all federal courts that have considered the problems posed
by offsetting affidavits have reconciled these seemingly conflicting
holdings and concluded that the sham affidavit doctrine is justified.
One reason cited for this conclusion is that previous depositions are
more reliable than offsetting affidavits, which carry virtually no
evidentiary weight. The Perma Research court declared that
deposition testimony was more reliable “since the deponent was
either cross-examined by opposing counsel, or at least available to
opposing counsel for cross-examination.”58 Several courts in different
circuits have adopted this analysis,59 with one court holding that the
“adversarial” nature of depositions renders them more credible than
affidavits.60 Moreover, the fact that affidavits are often drafted by
attorneys (who presumably are aware of Rule 56’s guidelines)
undercuts their trustworthiness in certain circumstances. The Seventh
Circuit explained:
We have been highly critical of efforts to patch up a party’s
deposition with his own subsequent affidavit. Almost all affidavits
56. Dibidale of La., Inc. v. American Bank & Trust Co., 916 F.2d 300, 307-08 (5th Cir.
1990).
57. See, e.g., Gross v. Southern Ry. Co., 414 F.2d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1969) (“It is also well
settled that in considering a motion for summary judgment, the court has no duty or function to
try or decide factual issues. Its only duty is to determine whether or not there is an issue of fact
to be tried.”); Olin v. Disneyland Int’l, 832 F. Supp. 1342, 1344 (D. Ariz. 1993) (“[S]ummary
judgment is not appropriate where the trial judge would be required to choose among
competing or conflicting inferences or to pass on the credibility of witnesses with differing
versions of material facts.”). For further discussion, see Molot, supra note 20, at 992 (“[T]he
Seventh Amendment is designed to preserve a system under which material issues of fact are for
juries—not lawyers or judges—to decide.”).
58. Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 578 (2d Cir. 1969).
59. See, e.g., Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 67-68 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Where
deposition and affidavit are in conflict, the affidavit is to be disregarded unless it is
demonstrable that . . . the deposition was mistaken . . . .”); Zorn v. Helene Curtis, Inc., 903 F.
Supp. 1226, 1234 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (following the precedent set by the Seventh Circuit);
Shearer v. Homestake Mining Co., 557 F. Supp. 549, 558 n.5 (D.S.D. 1983) (“[G]reater
reliability is usually attributed to the deposition.”).
60. See Darnell v. Target Stores, 16 F.3d 174, 176 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Inherently depositions
carry an increased level of reliability. Depositions are adversarial in nature and provide the
opportunity for direct and cross-examination.”). Richard Marcus has contended that the sham
affidavit doctrine is a manifestation of equitable concepts, involving “some intrinsic, and
justifiable, weighing of the evidence to favor the deposition as compared to the affidavit.”
Marcus, supra note 28, at 771-72.
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submitted in litigation are drafted by the lawyers rather than by the
affiants, and a comparison of the diction of [the plaintiff’s]
deposition with that of the affidavit makes clear that [this] affidavit
is no exception.61
Perma Research, which compiled many of these objections to
offsetting affidavits, is generally accepted as the leading federal case
concerning such affidavits. While its holding gives rise to several
concerns over the implementation of the sham affidavit doctrine, its
impact on the subsequent treatment of offsetting affidavits in federal
courts cannot be overstated.
C. Leading State Cases
More than their federal counterparts, state courts have struggled
to determine the best method of handling offsetting affidavits that
contradict prior deposition testimony. Since each state has its own
rules of civil procedure, the differences between states are more
pronounced than between federal courts of appeals. While some
states endorse the sham affidavit doctrine, others reject it outright.
Therefore, litigants submitting offsetting affidavits in state courts
often encounter less trouble in raising genuine issues of fact.
Several states with summary judgment rules similar to Federal
Rule 56 disregard sham affidavits as fraudulent representations.62 For
example, one Ohio appellate court held: “[T]o allow a party to avoid
summary judgment by the simple filing of an affidavit contradicting,
61. Russell, 51 F.3d at 67 (citations omitted). Other courts, however, have rejected this
proposition, reasoning that the particular facts and circumstances of the affidavit must be
considered to determine its veracity. See, e.g., Dudo v. Schaffer, 91 F.R.D. 128, 131-33 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (“[T]here can be no absolute rule as to when it is proper for the district court to exclude
from consideration an affidavit which contradicts earlier deposition testimony.”); Guarantee
Ins. Agency Co. v. Mid-Continental Realty Corp., 57 F.R.D. 555, 563 (N.D. Ill. 1972)
(“Defendants [suggest] . . . that the deposition is the more credible statement [when compared
to the offsetting affidavit]. The Court refuses to make such a determination . . . .”).
62. See, e.g., Inman v. Club on Sailboat Key, Inc., 342 So. 2d 1069, 1070 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977) (“A party who opposes summary judgment will not be permitted to alter the position of
his or her previous . . . testimony in order to defeat summary judgment.”); Fountaine v.
Hadlock, 270 N.E.2d 222, 225 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971) (“[A] counter-affidavit does not place in issue
material facts which had previously been removed from contention by a party’s deliberate and
unequivocal admissions under oath.”); ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-America Marine
Supply, 854 S.W.2d 371, 388 (Mo. 1993) (“[A] party may not avoid summary judgment by giving
inconsistent testimony and then offering the inconsistencies into the record in order to
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact.”); Price v. Becker, 812 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1991) (“Two sworn inconsistent statements by a party are of no probative value in
establishing a disputed issue of material fact.”).
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without explanation, that party’s prior testimony under oath would
destroy summary judgment as we know it.”63 Several of these courts
have relied upon the Perma Research precedent to reach their
conclusions,64 usually holding that offsetting affidavits should be
disregarded absent a compelling justification for the contradiction.65
Yet Perma Research has proven controversial in several state
jurisdictions.66 The Utah Supreme Court concluded, for example, that
the decision’s proclamations must be “administered with care,” since
“[i]t is common knowledge that witnesses sometimes misstate
themselves, may not properly understand the question propounded,
or give equivocal answers.”67 An Ohio appellate court classified the
Perma Research holding as the exception, not the general rule, to
summary judgment procedures:
63. Buckeye Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Cole, No. CA 86-01-006, 1986 WL 13274, at *2
(Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 24, 1986).
64. See, e.g., Caplener v. Bluebonnet Milling Co., 911 S.W.2d 586, 590 (Ark. 1995) (ruling
that the affidavit of the plaintiff’s expert witness directly contradicted the expert’s earlier
deposition testimony and could not be used to establish a question of fact); Mays v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp., 661 P.2d 348, 354-55 (Kan. 1983) (holding that although the party who submitted a
contradictory affidavit was not the nonmoving party, the contradicting affidavit could not defeat
summary judgment because the party had become a voluntary party as an intervenor and had a
financial interest in the outcome of the case); Wachovia Mortgage Co. v. Autry-Barker-Spurrier
Real Estate, 249 S.E.2d 727, 732 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (concluding that contradictory affidavits
may not be used to defeat summary judgment where the only issue of fact created is the affiant’s
credibility).
65. See, e.g., Robinson v. Hank Roberts, Inc., 514 So. 2d 958, 961 (Ala. 1987) (holding that
when a deposed party gives clear answers to unambiguous questions that negate the existence of
a genuine issue of material fact, that party cannot, without explanation, later create such an
issue with an affidavit that contradicts previous clear testimony); Wright v. Hills, 780 P.2d 416,
421 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that an inconsistent affidavit may preclude summary
judgment if the affiant was confused at the deposition and the affiant explains those aspects of
deposition testimony about which he or she was confused, or if the affiant lacked access to
material facts and sets forth newly discovered evidence); Gaboury v. Ireland Road Grace
Brethren, Inc., 446 N.E.2d 1310, 1314 (Ind. 1983) (holding that contradictory testimony in the
affidavit of a nonmovant may not defeat a summary judgment motion where the only issue of
fact raised is the credibility of the affiant).
66. For example, a Wisconsin court declined to adopt a rule similar to that of Perma
Research and remarked that it was limited to applying existing statutes and rules of law:
While this issue is unresolved in this jurisdiction, the federal courts have established a
rule to address such [offsetting] affidavits . . . . [The defendant] notes that this issue
arises with some degree of frequency and urges this court to adopt a similar rule in
Wisconsin. Without comment as to the desirability of such a rule, we must decline to
do so. . . . Any changes in state summary judgment methodology must either come
from the legislature or supreme court, and not this court.
Wolski v. Wilson, 497 N.W.2d 794, 797 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
67. Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Utah 1983).
COX.DOC 10/30/00  8:45 AM
274 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:261
While the rule of Perma Research is useful under the proper
circumstances, it is an exception to the general rules concerning
summary judgment, and should be used sparingly. . . . In considering
the record, the court is not free to weigh the evidence in order to
resolve factual disputes. . . . [W]here the affidavit is not by its nature
too incredible to be believed by reasonable minds it must be
considered by the court if it conflicts with an earlier deposition.68
This skepticism has led some state courts to grant or affirm
summary judgment motions based on offsetting affidavits only
reluctantly.69 Moreover, unlike federal courts, state courts do not
unanimously condemn seemingly fraudulent affidavits. One
Massachusetts appellate court held that a party is not bound by prior
deposition testimony substantiating the opponent’s version of the
facts, allowing affiants the ability to contradict prior deposition
testimony without hesitation.70 Several state courts have determined
that a party responding to a summary judgment motion is entitled to
have its offsetting affidavits considered by the trial judge.71 Other
state courts have endorsed a limited definition of “contradiction” in
this context, declaring that an affidavit that a federal court might label
as “offsetting” still presents a fact issue worthy of jury resolution.72
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court explained:
68. Mitchell v. TransOhio Sav., No. 10839, 1983 WL 3967, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 9,
1983).
69. See, e.g., Gamet v. Jenks, 197 N.W.2d 160, 164 (Mich. 1972) (“Had [the] plaintiff
offered any reason for the contradiction [between the offsetting affidavit and his prior
deposition testimony] we would be constrained to reverse [the grant of summary judgment].”);
Henderson-Rubio v. May Dep’t Stores, 632 P.2d 1289, 1295 n.6 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (“Our
decision is limited to . . . [cases] where the two statements are clearly inconsistent and no
attempt is made to explain the inconsistency [between an offsetting affidavit and a prior
deposition].”).
70. See Junkins v. Slender Woman, Inc., 386 N.E.2d 789, 790 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (“[I]t is
sufficient that the plaintiff’s later affidavit, if believed, indicated that the contrary is true. The
conflict presents a question of credibility, which is not to be resolved by the judge on a motion
for summary judgment.” (citations omitted)).
71. See, e.g., Stefan v. White, 257 N.W.2d 206, 208-09 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a
trial court must consider a plaintiff’s affidavit filed in answer to a summary judgment motion);
Delzer v. United Bank, 484 N.W.2d 502, 508 (N.D. 1992) (concluding that the trial court must
consider the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, depositions, and interrogatories as well as all
possible inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing a summary
judgment motion).
72. See, e.g., Anthony’s Pier Four, Inc. v. Crandall Dry Dock Eng’rs, Inc., 489 N.E.2d 172,
178 (Mass. 1986) (ruling that had affidavits contradicted prior testimony, the factfinder would
have needed to determine their credibility); Dryvit Sys., Inc. v. Feldspar Corp., No. C.A. 93-108,
1995 WL 941376, at *1-5 (R.I. Jan. 19, 1995) (concluding that even under the more stringent
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Although we recognize that there may be instances in which an
affidavit denying deposition testimony may not fairly raise a genuine
issue of material fact, we are reluctant to hold the plaintiff to
conclusions of law stated in her deposition. . . . Although . . . we are
skeptical of the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, particularly in light of
the admissions in her deposition . . . there was a genuine issue of
material fact to be tried . . . .73
Although the sham affidavit doctrine is generally associated with
civil litigation, it has also arisen in certain criminal cases. Mississippi
appellate courts have contemplated the doctrine’s ramifications when
considering the denial of petitioners’ requests for post-conviction
evidentiary hearings. In such cases, these courts have vigorously
enforced the sham affidavit doctrine.74 The Mississippi Supreme
Court declared in 1994:
There should be a strong presumption of validity of anyone’s
statement under oath. However, we are now faced with one
statement or the other not being the truth. . . . “Where the
petitioner’s version is belied by previous sworn testimony, for
example, as to render his affidavit a sham we will allow summary
judgment to stand.” If ever there was a sham, it is clearly within
these allegations . . . .75
While Mississippi courts have generally not allowed prisoners to
explain why their offsetting affidavits conflict with prior
representations, in other contexts and in other jurisdictions, state
courts have proven more receptive to offsetting affidavits than federal
courts. Affiants, therefore, more easily raise genuine issues of
material fact in certain state courts. The diversity in state court
approaches to offsetting affidavits greatly contrasts with the general
acceptance of the Perma Research decision among federal courts.
standard, the affidavits in the instant case would not be disregarded because none of the
statements flatly contradicted earlier deposition testimony).
73. Guenard v. Burke, 443 N.E.2d 892, 898 (Mass. 1982) (citations omitted); see also
Halbert v. Lange, 233 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950) (“[A]dmissions will be conclusive
only as long as they are allowed to stand. This conclusiveness, however, is destroyed if and when
the party corrects his statements, explains them, or introduces other testimony showing that he
could have been mistaken as to the facts.”).
74. See, e.g., Kirksey v. State, 728 So. 2d 565, 567 (Miss. 1999) (“It is clear from [the
plaintiff’s] testimony that the affidavits to the petition are merely a sham.”); Simpson v. State,
678 So. 2d 712, 716 (Miss. 1996) (“Simpson’s claims are so totally contradicted by the record on
its face so as to render his current affidavit a ‘sham.’”).
75. Mowdy v. State, 638 So. 2d 738, 743 (Miss. 1994) (misquoting Harris v. State, 578 So. 2d
617, 620 (Miss. 1991)).
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II.  JUSTIFYING THE SHAM AFFIDAVIT DOCTRINE
Although the sham affidavit doctrine has not received much
attention from scholarly sources, federal and state courts have
routinely applied it since 1969. The rules of civil procedure in the
federal and state systems do not speak to the issue of sham affidavits,
but many judges who have faced the question have determined that
offsetting affidavits do not create genuine issues of fact. Since courts
can dispose of cases not presenting genuine issues, the sham affidavit
doctrine, when enforced correctly, is consistent with the rules
governing summary judgment. Supreme Court dicta and the capacity
of lower courts to distinguish sham affidavits from affidavits that raise
genuine issues justify the continuance of a flexible form of the
doctrine.
A. The Supreme Court’s Implicit Support for the Sham Affidavit
Doctrine
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
propriety of the sham affidavit doctrine, language from Justice
White’s majority opinion in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby76 suggests that
the doctrine is consistent with the Court’s modern approach toward
summary judgment. In Anderson, the Court clarified that if a judge
decides that based upon the evidence presented with the motion, a
reasonable jury could not find for the nonmovant, summary judgment
is proper.77 This rule allows for the existence of the sham affidavit
doctrine. If an affiant contradicts previous deposition testimony
without explanation, the trial judge can rightly hold that a judgment
in his favor would not be reasonable. As Justice White concluded:
“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on
which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.”78
The Anderson Court reiterated that the dispositive issue in ruling
on summary judgment motions is the determination of whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists:
Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or
76. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
77. See id. at 251.
78. Id. at 252.
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unnecessary will not be counted. . . . There is no requirement that
the trial judge make findings of fact. The inquiry performed is the
threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a
trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues
that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they
may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.79
This holding coincides with the textual instruction that judges
should construe and administer the Federal Rules to “secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”80 The
Anderson Court distinguished a judge’s determination regarding the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact from a judge’s
determination on an issue of credibility. “[I]t is clear enough from our
recent cases,” Justice White wrote, “that at the summary judgment
stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial.”81
It is the latter determination that allows judges to disregard sham
affidavits. Trial courts can conclude that a particular factual dispute is
irrelevant to a summary judgment motion if the dispute emanates
from an affiant’s inability to maintain a consistent story. Such a
dispute would not “properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.”82 By allowing a fabricated issue of fact to reach a jury, a
judge would violate the responsibility to secure a “just, speedy, and
79. Id. at 248-50. The defendants moved for summary judgment after discovery, asserting
that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of getting a libel claim to the jury, given the “actual
malice” standards for libel established in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964).
80. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. Commentators generally agree that the Supreme Court’s decisions in
the 1985 Term revamped summary judgment practice in the federal courts. See, e.g., Jeffrey W.
Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary Judgment,
Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 99 (1988) (noting that in
three cases, the Supreme Court “specifically equated the standard for granting summary
judgment . . . with the directed verdict standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a),”
confirming previous practice). Similarly, Judge Patricia M. Wald of the District of Columbia
Circuit reports the consensus that the Supreme Court has put summary judgment to greater use:
What almost everyone in the academic and legal communities agreed on was that the
Supreme Court had moved summary judgment out of left field and onto first base,
where it began shortening the innings by taking out runners before they could even
begin to make the rounds. From 1986 to the present day, summary judgment has
remained at first base and, some would say, it is getting progressively better at tagging
runners out.
Wald, supra note 20, at 1914-15.
81. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
82. Id. at 248.
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inexpensive determination,”83 because such a ruling would have the
primary effect of preserving a claim that a reasonable jury could not
believe.
Nor does the sham affidavit doctrine, when properly applied,
infringe on the jury’s prerogative to determine issues of credibility. In
deciding motions for summary judgment, judges consider whether a
reasonable jury could enter a judgment for the nonmovant.84 If,
however, a nonmovant’s affidavit appears a mere sham when
compared with previous deposition admissions, the judge can rightly
determine that a reasonable jury would accord the affidavit no
evidentiary weight whatsoever.85 Although critics of the doctrine
argue that Anderson stands for the proposition that judges in jury
cases may not determine the credibility of evidence,86 a principle
endorsed by the Court since long before the adoption of the summary
judgment rule,87 Anderson specifically allows judges to grant summary
judgment on disputed records.88 Therefore, if a court believes an
offsetting affidavit was offered specifically to defeat a motion for
summary judgment and that no jury could “properly proceed to find a
verdict” for the affiant,89 summary judgment is proper. Consequently,
while the Supreme Court has not definitively endorsed the sham
affidavit doctrine, the Anderson decision implicitly supports it.
83. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
84. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
85. See id. at 252.
86. See, e.g., Duane, supra note 24, at 1600-01 (“[The Supreme Court] has recently and
unambiguously indicated (albeit in dictum) that summary judgment does not permit a judge to
decide whether the affidavit of a witness may be rejected on the grounds that it conflicts with his
earlier sworn testimony.”); Holley, supra note 24, at 875 (“The ambiguity in Anderson is that, on
the one hand, it generally tells the district judge to determine if the nonmovant’s evidence is
probative enough to go to trial while, on the other hand, it specifically tells the judge not to
determine if that same evidence is credible.”).
87. Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that juries are well-equipped to determine the
weight and credibility of witness testimony:
There are many things sometimes in the conduct of a witness upon the stand, and
sometimes in the mode in which his answers are drawn from him through the
questioning of counsel, by which a jury are to be guided in determining the weight
and credibility of his testimony. That part of every case, such as the one at bar,
belongs to the jury, who are presumed to be fitted for it by their natural intelligence
and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of men; and so long as we have
jury trials they should not be disturbed in their possession of it, except in a case of
manifest and extreme abuse of their function.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891).
88. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
89. Id. at 251.
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B. The Capability of Federal and State Courts to Distinguish Between
Issues Requiring Jury Resolution and Sham Issues
With no directly applicable holding from the Supreme Court on
the sham affidavit doctrine, many federal and state courts have
developed a distinction in the summary judgment context between
credibility issues and sham issues. These courts have concluded that
sham affidavits do not introduce issues of credibility, because they are
precluded from consideration by the affiant’s unambiguous
deposition admissions.90 This distinction is consistent with the basic
justification of summary judgment—“enabl[ing] the court to
expeditiously dispose of cases by giving judgment on the law where
the material facts are not in dispute.”91 In some circumstances, when
parties admit in a deposition to certain conduct, they place the
material facts of a case out of dispute, and a transparent subsequent
denial of such admissions should not be considered. Indeed, the
ability to dispose of sham claims is crucial, since the longer the case
remains viable, the better a litigant’s opportunities for settlement,
regardless of that litigant’s chances at trial. If courts could not enforce
the sham affidavit doctrine, parties responding to summary judgment
motions would have an incentive to submit fraudulent affidavits,
hoping merely to preserve their claims long enough to reach a jury or
inflate the value of their claims.92
90. See, e.g., Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Plaintiffs
confuse credibility issues with the district court’s duty to ignore sham issues in determining the
appropriateness of summary judgment. . . . Otherwise, the very purpose of the summary
judgment motion—to weed out unfounded claims, specious denials, and sham defenses—would
be severely undercut.”); Selsor v. Callaghan & Co., 609 F. Supp. 1003, 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(“Although our duty in ruling on this summary judgment motion is to resolve issues of
credibility in [the plaintiff’s] favor, this duty extends only to plausible issues of credibility.”).
91. Surkin v. Charteris, 197 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir. 1952); see also David A. Sonenshein, State
of Mind and Credibility in the Summary Judgment Context: A Better Approach, 78 NW. U. L.
REV. 774, 774 (1983) (“When properly employed, this [summary judgment] motion operates to
conserve the resources of the courts by eliminating trials that would serve no purpose because
no genuine issue of material fact remains to be resolved.”); 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2712, at 198 (Civil 3d ed. 1998) (“[In summary
judgment proceedings,] dilatory tactics resulting from the assertion of unfounded claims or the
interposition of specious denials or sham defenses can be defeated, parties may be accorded
expeditious justice, and some of the pressure on court dockets may be alleviated.”).
92. See Holley, supra note 24, at 878 (“Even if a jury would certainly find the plaintiff’s
second testimony to be incredible at trial, the plaintiff, by surviving summary judgment, will at
least preserve the settlement value of the case and probably can proceed to settle for a minimal,
yet completely undeserved, sum.”).
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Some offsetting affidavits, however, are not fraudulent at all.
Therefore, many federal courts have developed the general approach
of presuming an offsetting affidavit is valid until proven a sham, thus
allowing litigants responding to summary judgment motions more
flexibility.93 Such a presumption coincides with the Supreme Court’s
admonition that “the inferences to be drawn from the underlying
facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion [for summary judgment].”94 The opportunity to
explain contradictions between offsetting affidavits and prior
deposition testimony is crucial, because an adverse ruling on a
summary judgment motion terminates the nonmovant’s claims. The
Eleventh Circuit explained:
A definite distinction must be made between discrepancies which
create transparent shams and discrepancies which create an issue of
credibility . . . . To allow every failure of memory or variation in a
witness’s testimony to be disregarded as a sham would require far
too much from lay witnesses and would deprive the trier of fact of
the traditional opportunity to determine which point in time and
with which words the witness (in this case, the affiant) was stating
the truth.95
Many federal courts have proven their capacity to undertake
extensive analyses in determining whether an offsetting affidavit,
though initially presumed to be valid, is actually a sham.96 In these
circumstances, judges often conclude, after scrutinizing an offsetting
affidavit carefully, that it does not present a genuine issue of material
93. See, e.g., Darnell v. Target Stores, 16 F.3d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[E]ssential
elements of [the plaintiff’s] case were shown by his deposition testimony to be without factual
foundation. His subsequent remedial effort consisted of filing . . . contradictory affidavits. This
effort was unavailing.”); Durtsche v. American Colloid Co., 958 F.2d 1007, 1010 n.2 (10th Cir.
1992) (declaring that “an affidavit submitted on a summary judgment motion which conflicts
with the affiant’s earlier sworn testimony is not automatically disregarded”); Kennedy v. Allied
Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 267 (9th Cir. 1991) (remanding a case for a determination of
whether an offsetting affidavit, presumed by the trial judge to be a “sham,” created a genuine
issue of material fact).
94. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
95. Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 953-54 (11th Cir. 1986).
96. See, e.g., Lowie v. Raymark Indus., 676 F. Supp. 1214, 1217 (S.D. Ga. 1987) (“The
benefit given to a nonmovant in summary judgment, generally, is also given to the narrower
issue of determining whether the affidavit, in fact, contradicts prior testimony.”); Office Supply
Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 785 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (“An affidavit of a witness
which conflicts with his deposition testimony should . . . be considered on a summary judgment
motion . . . .”).
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fact.97 When courts evaluate offsetting affidavits in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant, however, these affidavits sometimes
appear consistent with previous deposition testimony, at least in
part.98 Even within a single affidavit, some claims may raise genuine
issues, while some claims may be shams.99
Similar to most federal courts, many state courts undertake
lengthy reviews of deposition responses to compare them with those
in offsetting affidavits.100 In striking contrast to federal courts,
however, Tennessee courts have held that even if an offsetting
affidavit clearly contradicts prior deposition testimony, a genuine
issue of fact precludes summary judgment. These courts have
sometimes refused to engage in a line-by-line analysis of the differing
statements, citing the proposition that trial judges may not weigh
evidentiary issues in summary judgment motions.101
97. See, e.g., Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986) (“[The plaintiff’s]
earlier testimony is unequivocal. . . . [T]his is one of those unusual cases in which the conflict . . .
raises only a sham issue.”); Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 960 (4th Cir. 1984) (“The
entire content of the [offsetting] affidavit is conclusory, it does not set forth facts of which the
plaintiff has personal knowledge and it does not give specific facts . . . . [The plaintiff’s
offsetting] affidavit is a vain effort to create an issue of fact . . . .”); Dotson v. United States
Postal Serv., 794 F. Supp. 654, 660 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (“Plaintiff, therefore, has mislead [sic] the
court . . . with two conflicting statements, each made under oath.”).
98. See, e.g., Dibidale of La., Inc. v. American Bank & Trust Co., 916 F.2d 300, 307 (5th
Cir. 1990) (“To the extent they exist, discrepancies in those averments present credibility issues
properly put to the trier of fact.”); Holland v. Jefferson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1314
n.3 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[The plaintiff’s] affidavit presents no direct contradiction of any plain or
unequivocal admission in her deposition. . . . In her affidavit, [the plaintiff] merely clarified the
sequence of events . . . .”). In one case, the Eleventh Circuit found that, although a particular
discrepancy in the plaintiff’s testimony could affect the jury’s determination of his credibility
and persuasiveness, the discrepancy was not so inconsistent so as to warrant summary judgment:
Although a jury may find this discrepancy in [the plaintiff’s] testimony to affect his
credibility or to diminish its persuasiveness, it is not so inherently inconsistent that the
court must disregard the previous affidavit . . . . Because assessing the credibility and
weight of the evidence are questions of fact for the trier of fact . . . summary judgment
was improper.
Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 954-55 (11th Cir. 1986).
99. See, e.g., Lambert v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1385, 1389-91
(M.D. Ala. 1998) (refusing to find the affidavit “inherently inconsistent” with prior testimony,
although the court was “suspicio[us]” of some allegations).
100. See, e.g., Keeven v. Estate of Keeven, 882 P.2d 457, 465 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (“[The
plaintiff’s] deposition responses . . . are vague and evasive, but because they are vague and
express uncertainty, they are not directly contradicted by statements in his later affidavit.”);
Borus v. Yellow Cab Co., 367 N.E.2d 277, 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (“[W]e have carefully
examined both the deposition and the affidavit and have been able to find no real
contradiction.”).
101. See, e.g., Austin Powder Co. v. Thompson, No. 03A01-9408-CH-00294, 1995 WL 33778,
at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 1995) (“We express no opinion regarding [the defendant’s]
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Whether in federal or state courts, the determination that an
offsetting affidavit is a sham, despite its presumption of validity, is
squarely within the judge’s discretion at the summary judgment stage.
In 1993, the Seventh Circuit provided a cogent explanation of the
federal judge’s power:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 empowers a court to make a
threshold determination of whether a factual issue is “genuine.” This
power does not emanate from the court’s role as a fact-finder, a role
which lays dormant during the summary judgment process. Rather,
this power emanates from a court’s ability to make an initial
assessment of any evidence. A district court exercises its prerogative
to assess evidence at trial by determining whether any evidence is
admissible. The court is not acting as a fact-finder when it makes
such determinations. A district court also exercises its prerogative to
assess evidence at the summary judgment stage by determining
whether an alleged factual conflict is “genuine.”102
Additionally, judges already make several relatively
uncontroversial decisions similar to determining that an offsetting
affidavit does not create a genuine issue of fact, providing
supplementary support for the doctrine. One leading treatise notes
that courts often grant summary judgment on disputed records
without weighing evidence:
[C]ourts have sometimes ruled that facts offered by the nonmovant
[for summary judgment] are insufficient as a matter of law to
warrant a jury determination of liability, even when the facts are
uncontested by the movant and concededly provide at least some
evidentiary support to the nonmovant.103
credibility or the conclusion to be reached after the trial court evaluates the testimony and other
relevant evidence that may be offered at trial. This is not our role.”); Wilkerson v. Standard
Knitting Mills, Inc., No. 1261, 1989 WL 120298, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1989) (“There is
no need to detail here the conflicting testimony given in various discovery depositions and
affidavits filed in the case . . . .”).
102. Unterreiner v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 8 F.3d 1206, 1212 (7th Cir. 1993) (disregarding
an offsetting affidavit determined to be a sham). In dissent, Judge Rovner argued that the
plaintiff’s central assertion in the affidavit did not contradict his previous deposition testimony
but simply created a “disparity.” Id. at 1215 (Rovner, J., dissenting). She declared: “We may
think that [the plaintiff’s] recollection is selective, unreliable, or even fabricated, and a jury
might agree. But a jury would render such an assessment having looked [the plaintiff] and the
other witnesses in the eye—something no judge or jury has had the opportunity to do here.” Id.
at 1217 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
103. 11 MOORE ET AL., supra note 26, § 56.11[5][a].
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A trial judge could conclude that because the affiant had already
admitted to certain conduct, precipitating the motion for summary
judgment, a simple denial of that admission does not present
“sufficient” evidence to reach a jury as a matter of law. Just as a judge
can grant a motion for summary judgment if a party’s responses to
that motion are extremely “weak” or “irrelevant,”104 so can a judge
grant summary judgment against a party submitting a sham affidavit.
Offsetting affidavits often represent “weak” attempts to deny
previous admissions, and such affidavits should not clear the
sufficiency threshold for jury resolution.
Moreover, courts can grant summary judgment when the
evidence overwhelmingly favors one side. For example, a court will
grant summary judgement when a defendant admits to certain
conduct, proving liability as a matter of law.105 Similarly, an offsetting
affidavit should not preclude summary judgment where the great
weight of the evidence demonstrates the fallacies of that affidavit.
Judges cannot decide issues of credibility, but judges have great
discretion when credibility is not at issue. As an illustration, consider
a circumstance in which two or more witnesses dispute the facts of a
claim. The court cannot decide which person is telling the truth, as
that is a matter of credibility.106 When a person submits a sham
affidavit, however, there is no such dispute between two persons.
Without impermissibly deciding a matter of credibility, judges can
conclude that, in light of the affiant’s prior deposition testimony, an
offsetting affidavit is completely beyond belief.
104. See, e.g., Applegate v. Top Assocs., Inc., 425 F.2d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 1970) (requiring the
plaintiff to “support vague accusation and surmise with concrete particulars”); Nieman v. Long,
31 F. Supp. 30, 30-31 (E.D. Pa. 1939) (disallowing a response that the defendant was “unable to
ascertain whether the facts stated are true”); Gross v. Federal Reserve Bank, 29 F. Supp. 1005,
1005 (S.D. Ohio 1939) (rejecting the plaintiff’s claim as “untenable, if not reprehensible”).
105. See, e.g., United States v. 2204 Barbara Lane, 960 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1992)
(affirming the conviction of a defendant who did not respond to allegations of facilitating illegal
drug transactions); United States v. Kasuboski, 834 F.2d 1345, 1350 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that
default admissions suffice for summary judgment purposes); Donovan v. Carls Drug Co., 703
F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming a judgment based on default admissions).
106. The Seventh Circuit recently noted this limitation on the court’s ability to evaluate
conflicting testimony:
Were the conflict at issue between statements given by two separate individuals,
summary judgment would be inappropriate because the district court may not weigh
conflicting evidence. The situation is quite different, however, when a witness has
contradicted directly his or her own earlier statements without explaining adequately
the contradiction or without attempting to resolve the disparity.
Bank of Ill. v. Allied Signal Safety Restraint Sys., 75 F.3d 1162, 1168 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted).
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The sham affidavit doctrine appears consistent with the inherent
powers of trial judges, who can distinguish between offsetting
affidavits that create issues of genuine fact and offsetting affidavits
that raise only sham issues. Judges already make several comparable
decisions in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact
requires jury resolution. Taken together, the Supreme Court’s
implicit support for the sham affidavit doctrine and the capability of
judges to determine whether an offsetting affidavit presents a genuine
issue are compelling reasons for federal and state courts to retain a
flexible form of the doctrine.
III.  DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE SHAM AFFIDAVIT DOCTRINE
A. Establishing Exceptions
Presuming that an offsetting affidavit is a sham can disadvantage
respondents to summary judgment motions who have legitimate
reasons for contradicting prior deposition testimony. The sham
affidavit doctrine should not lock parties into deposition admissions
with such inflexibility. One way to ensure that each offsetting affidavit
receives proper consideration is to allow affiants the chance to
explain why their affidavit contradicts their prior deposition answers.
Without this opportunity, the sham affidavit doctrine violates the
court’s responsibility to afford respondents to summary judgment
motions all reasonable inferences.107 One court has explained that a
party who has “emphatically and wittingly [sworn] to a fact” bears a
“heavy burden . . . when it seeks to jettison its sworn statement.”108
That burden, however, should not result in the perfunctory disposal
of genuine issues raised by offsetting affidavits.
When no mitigating factors explain contradictions between
offsetting affidavits and prior deposition testimony, courts have
granted or affirmed summary judgments without compunction.109
107. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
108. Pyramid Sec. v. IB Resolution, Inc., 924 F.2d 1114, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
109. See, e.g., Sinskey v. Pharmacia Ophthalmics, Inc., 982 F.2d 494, 498 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(holding that a party seeking to create an issue of fact through a “later, inconsistent declaration”
must “provide a satisfactory explanation for the discrepancy”); Miller v. A.H. Robins Co., 766
F.2d 1102, 1104-05 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming summary judgment when the plaintiff verified the
authenticity of his deposition testimony before rejecting it without explanation in an offsetting
affidavit). In the absence of a satisfactory explanation for an attempt to retract a sworn
statement, a court will hold a plaintiff to his prior assertions of fact. One district judge
explained:
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Generally, offsetting affidavits are impermissible in federal courts
unless they provide a satisfactory or plausible explanation for any
discrepancies.110 When a litigant denied knowledge on a certain
subject during a deposition, one court determined that the litigant’s
offsetting affidavit, in which he presented specific recollections on the
“forgotten” subject, was too unlikely to be genuine.111
In some circumstances, though, a reasonable justification for the
contradiction may exist. For example, requiring deponents to
remember intricate details of events occurring several years earlier
may, on occasion, represent an excessive burden. The Eleventh
Circuit encountered such a situation in 1986, when the deposition in
question, taken in 1981, concerned work sites, dates, and products
encountered by the affiant in the 1960s.112 Rather than asking for
perfect recollection, the court allowed an offsetting affidavit to
contradict certain aspects of the deposition testimony.113
The Fifth Circuit provided the leading case for the proposition
that the sham affidavit doctrine is acceptable only given certain
qualifications. In Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone,114 the court allowed
the respondent to a summary judgment motion to submit an
offsetting affidavit. The affidavit clarified his answers to deposition
questions that had confused him.115 The court began by holding that
It is true that clear, intelligent, unequivocal statements of fact, unfavorable to his
position taken in his pleading, made under oath during the taking of a deposition, by
a party to an action in full possession of his mental faculties should be considered as
conclusively established and binding upon him in the absence of an offer of any
explanation or modification, or of a showing of mistake or improvidence, and that
this consequence should be attributed to such statements for the purpose of ruling
upon a motion for summary judgment.
Southern Rendering Co. v. Standard Rendering Co., 112 F. Supp. 103, 108 (E.D. Ark. 1953).
110. See, e.g., Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 67-68 (7th Cir. 1995) (requiring
evidentiary materials that were more than “pretextual”); Colantuoni v. Calcagni & Sons, Inc., 44
F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 91, at 30-31) (disregarding an
offsetting affidavit that provided no explanation for a contradiction with prior testimony).
111. See Unterreiner v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 8 F.3d 1206, 1210 (7th Cir. 1993).
112. See Lane v. Celotex Corp., 782 F.2d 1526, 1533 (11th Cir. 1986).
113. See id.
114. 622 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1980).
115. The case concerned a promissory note and an employment agreement. Bone, the
manager of one of Kennett-Murray’s stockyards, signed both documents in 1975. The latter
document rendered Bone personally liable to Kennett-Murray for half the net losses his division
of the company suffered. Bone had signed virtually identical documents in 1974, except that
those documents did not contain the personal liability clauses. In the 1975 promissory note,
Bone acknowledged his share of the stockyard’s losses for the 1974 fiscal year. When Bone
resigned in 1977, Kennett-Murray demanded that he reimburse the company for the losses his
division suffered under his tenure. Bone refused, so Kennett-Murray sued, seeking enforcement
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offsetting affidavits must be considered in determining whether
summary judgment is appropriate: “‘An opposing party’s affidavit
should be considered although it differs from or varies his evidence as
given by deposition . . . and the two in conjunction may disclose an
issue of credibility.’”116 It then distinguished the Perma Research
decision, holding that Bone’s clarification did not constitute a sham,
and that his excuses for the contradiction were acceptable:
Bone’s affidavit did not purport to raise a new matter, but rather to
explain certain aspects of his deposition testimony. Bone stated that
he was confused during the deposition and at one point thought that
the questioning concerned the promissory note whereas in fact it
related to the signing of the employment contract. Bone’s assertion
is at least plausible. . . . The affidavit is not inherently inconsistent
with Bone’s earlier testimony.117
The court subsequently afforded Bone the benefit of several
debatable propositions, including that his deposition could not be
“taken literally” to mean that Kennett-Murray representatives had
never discussed his new employment agreement with him:
Certainly, one would expect two business associates meeting to sign
important documents to exchange some words. Bone may simply
have meant that [the representative] did not affirmatively state
anything about the specific content of either document. Such a view
would not necessarily foreclose the possibility that [the
representative] made some general remark that the contract was like
the earlier version.118
Reactions to Kennett-Murray by subsequent courts have been
mixed. One federal court concluded that its holding is inapplicable to
of the two documents. Bone responded that no consideration existed, because a Kennett-
Murray representative fraudulently induced him to sign the employment agreement. During his
deposition, however, Bone said Kennett-Murray officials made no representations to him
regarding either the promissory note or the employment contract. Kennett-Murray moved for
summary judgment based on this testimony. Accompanying his answer to the motion, Bone
submitted an affidavit that alleged a Kennett-Murray representative told him his new agreement
was identical to his previous agreement. To justify this contradiction, Bone testified that he
meant to say that the representative was silent regarding the promissory note, but that the
representative had fraudulently misinformed him about the new employment agreement.
Rejecting Bone’s arguments, the district court granted summary judgment. The court of appeals
reversed. See id. at 889-90.
116. Id. at 893 (quoting 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 26, § 56.522).
117. Id. at 894.
118. Id.
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cases involving offsetting affidavits that are proven to be shams.119
Another federal court, however, cited Kennett-Murray for the
proposition that offsetting affidavits should be considered in summary
judgment motions when affiants can explain their “‘sudden change of
heart’” with a “‘plausible explanation.’”120 Kennett-Murray remains
the leading case holding that a litigant’s explanation for
contradictions between an offsetting affidavit and previous deposition
testimony can render the affidavit relevant to a summary judgment
motion ruling.
Since 1980, two generally acceptable excuses for contradictions
between offsetting affidavits and previous deposition testimony have
emerged in federal and state courts. The first exception, at issue in
Kennett-Murray, arises when the person submitting an offsetting
affidavit states that she was confused during the deposition. This
explanation is so well-established in case law that courts have
affirmed its viability even when the nonmovant does not assert it.121
When there is some basis for the respondent’s claim of confusion,
courts have allowed offsetting affidavits to correct previous
deposition admissions and create material issues of fact.122 Judges
have appeared more willing to allow offsetting affidavits to clarify
119. See Van T. Junkins & Assocs. v. U.S. Indus., 736 F.2d 656, 658 (11th Cir. 1984). The
dissenting judge in Junkins sharply disagreed with this holding: “The majority’s claim . . . reads
Kennett-Murray much too narrowly. Although the Kennett-Murray Court expressly avoided
outright rejection of the Perma Research and Radobenko holdings, it clearly launched this
Court’s precedent in a different direction.” Id. at 659 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
120. Unterreiner v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 8 F.3d 1206, 1210 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Richardson v. Bonds, 860 F.2d 1427, 1433 (7th Cir. 1988)).
121. See, e.g., Dotson v. United States Postal Serv., 794 F. Supp. 654, 659 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
(“[A]n inconsistent affidavit may preclude summary judgment if the affiant was confused during
the deposition.”); Letson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 1221, 1230 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (“[I]f
the deposition reflects confusion and the affidavit assertion is plausible, then the affidavit should
not be rejected. These mitigating factors are not present in the case at bar.”). In a recent
medical insurance case, the Eighth Circuit allowed a physician’s deposition testimony regarding
the plaintiff’s chances for recovery to be considered, though the physician had admittedly
confused the nature of the plaintiff’s occupation. See Herring v. Canada Life Assurance Co., 207
F.3d 1026, 1030-31 (8th Cir. 2000). The doctor’s opinion regarding the plaintiff’s ability to work,
the court ruled, was “the same regardless of whether [the plaintiff] worked as a draftsman or a
senior traffic manager.” Id. at 1031.
122. See, e.g., RSBI Aerospace, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 49 F.3d 399, 402 (8th Cir.
1995) (observing that the deposition in question reflected confusion, which the offsetting
affidavit rightfully explained); Kim v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 921 F.2d 197, 199 (8th Cir. 1990)
(finding the plaintiff’s explanation of the discrepancy with prior testimony adequate where the
plaintiff, who did not speak English, was relying on a translator throughout his deposition);
Clapp v. Oregonian Publ’g Co., 732 P.2d 928, 931 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (acknowledging that
Oregon state courts allow for the confusion exception).
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contradictions when confusion resulted from a case’s highly technical
subject matter. For example, when a plaintiff’s medical expert did not
distinguish in his deposition between different standards of care for
particular surgeons, the expert, who was confused by the deposition
questions, was allowed to modify his testimony with an offsetting
affidavit.123 In a different case, the Seventh Circuit allowed a plaintiff
in a products liability action to submit an offsetting affidavit that
contradicted a damaging deposition admission concerning her failure
to search for the defendant’s safety device.124 The appellate court held
that the plaintiff’s affidavit, though submitted after the trial judge had
granted summary judgment for the defendant, should nevertheless
have been considered, since it clarified confusing testimony in a
complex case.125
Yet the simple assertion that an offsetting affidavit is entitled to
consideration in a summary judgment motion because of confusion
during a deposition is not always sufficient. When parties testify
clearly during depositions, displaying no confusion whatsoever, some
federal courts have not allowed those parties to contradict their
testimony with offsetting affidavits.126 One Ohio federal court even
rejected a party’s attempt to introduce evidence regarding certain
medications he had taken shortly before his deposition.127 Those
medications had allegedly induced the affiant’s confusion.128
The second generally accepted justification for contradictions
between offsetting affidavits and prior deposition testimony arises
when the affiant obtains new evidence not available during the
deposition. This exception is generally uncontroversial, and it has
been recognized by numerous federal and state courts.129 One federal
123. See Ramos v. Geddes, 137 F.R.D. 11, 11-12 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
124. See Deimer v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prod., Inc., 990 F.2d 342, 345-46 (7th Cir. 1993).
Deimer, a nurse, was injured when she moved one of the defendant’s products across a hospital
room. See id. at 344. She admitted in her deposition that she had not searched for the safety
device, which would have prevented her injuries. See id. at 345.
125. See id. at 345-46 & n.3.
126. See, e.g., EEOC v. Oak Lawn Ltd. II, 987 F. Supp. 647, 651 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“The
deposition does not indicate that [the defendant] was confused. [The defendant] answered
numerous questions about [his company], illustrating that he understood the workings of [his
company].”).
127. See Mays v. Hunter, 717 F. Supp. 1247, 1251 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
128. See id. at 1250 (discounting the plaintiff’s explanation that the “significant amounts of
pain killers” he had ingested, coupled with “numerous surgeries, consultations and
examinations,” led him to confuse the accrual date of his cause of action during his deposition).
129. See, e.g., Adelman-Tremblay v. Jewel Cos., 859 F.2d 517, 521 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting
affidavits unless there is new evidence and the new affidavit helps to give foundation to the
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court considered an offsetting affidavit when the affiant claimed that
newly discovered photographs, unavailable during his deposition, had
refreshed his memory of certain events.130 Another court allowed an
expert witness to submit an offsetting affidavit when recently
discovered evidence changed his opinion on the causation issues
involved in the case.131 Many judges enforce this exception quite
literally, however. If the affiant had access to the information during
the previous deposition, it is generally not considered “new” for the
purposes of submitting an offsetting affidavit.132
Courts have disagreed on how to treat situations in which
respondents offer unique explanations for contradictions between
offsetting affidavits and prior deposition testimony. Some federal
courts consider all offsetting affidavits when their contradiction with
prior testimony is reasonably justified.133 Other federal courts,
claim); Waitek v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 908 F. Supp. 672, 686 (N.D. Iowa 1995)
(finding that a plausible change in testimony may still establish a genuine issue of material fact);
Sisson v. Hatteras Yachts, Inc., No. 87C0652, 1989 WL 106584, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 1989)
(considering an offsetting affidavit where an expert witness changed his mind following the
introduction of new evidence); O’Brien v. Analog Devices, Inc., 606 N.E.2d 937, 939 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1993) (rejecting an offsetting affidavit because it lacked a foundation in new evidence).
Idaho state courts have been particularly receptive to this justification, declaring at one juncture
that there is “no ‘contradiction’ where the witness asserts in his affidavit facts which, at the time
of his earlier deposition, he specifically had asserted he could not recall.” Tolmie Farms, Inc. v.
J.R. Simplot Co., 862 P.2d 299, 302 (Idaho 1992) (quoting Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952
F.2d 262, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1991)).
130. See Rowson v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 866 F. Supp. 1221, 1230-31 (N.D. Iowa 1994):
Such an explanation of [the plaintiff’s] change in testimony is at least plausible, and
the court should not now pass on what credibility a jury may give it or the changed
testimony. Although [the defendant] asserts that [the plaintiff’s] new testimony is
inherently inconsistent with his prior testimony, and that there was no confusion
about that testimony at the time of the deposition, the court is not persuaded that
these factors are relevant to circumstances in which the reason presented for the
change in testimony is refreshed recollection.
131. See Endo v. Albertine, 863 F. Supp. 708, 724 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (allowing an expert
witness to respond to newly discovered reasoning and methodology of the opposing expert).
132. See, e.g., Bank of Ill. v. Allied Signal Safety Restraint Sys., 75 F.3d 1162, 1172 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding that a car seatbelt’s propensity for inertial release was not newly discovered
evidence, since the plaintiffs had access to that information before admitting their son’s seatbelt
had not been buckled); Vanlandingham v. Ford Motor Co., 99 F.R.D. 1, 3 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(refusing to apply the “new evidence” exception when a witness “was and has been available to
counsel for all parties”).
133. See, e.g., Dunavant v. Moore, 907 F.2d 77, 79 n.4 (8th Cir. 1990) (allowing an issue of
material fact to proceed beyond summary judgment despite an obvious contradiction in
testimony); Rowson, 866 F. Supp. at 1230 (permitting a plausible change in testimony at the
summary judgment phase of a claim).
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however, have rejected alternative excuses for contradictions,134 with
the Seventh Circuit declaring them “little more than bald assertions”
without merit.135 Generally, state courts have refused to accept
excuses a reasonable jury could not believe.136
The reasonableness test seems consistent with the judge’s
responsibility to determine what constitutes a genuine fact. While
federal and state courts should continue to allow litigants to explain
contradictions between offsetting affidavits and previous deposition
testimony on the basis of confusion or new evidence, other equally
legitimate justifications are conceivable. Courts should, therefore, use
an affidavit-specific analysis and evaluate each excuse for
contradiction on its own merits.
B. Applying the Doctrine to Non-Parties
Courts that implement the sham affidavit doctrine also must
determine whether to extend its provisions to nonparties. Several
federal courts have disregarded affidavits in those situations,
especially when they do not explain contradictions with prior
testimony.137 The Seventh Circuit provided a representative example,
affirming a grant of summary judgment in a products liability action
against a plaintiff who relied on the offsetting affidavit of an expert
witness:
We can think of no reason, however, not to apply [the sham
affidavit] rule to the present case involving the testimony and
affidavit of the plaintiff’s sole expert witness. The purpose of
summary judgment motions—to weed out unfounded claims,
134. See, e.g., Colantuoni v. Calcagni & Sons, Inc., 44 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994) (rejecting the
plaintiff’s excuse that while his deposition testimony described his state of mind at the time of
the deposition, his affidavit described his state of mind at the time of the accident in question);
Thurman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 952 F.2d 128, 137 n.23 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the
plaintiff’s excuse that he was “outwitted” by defense counsel during his deposition).
135. Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 1985).
136. See, e.g., Robinson v. Hank Roberts, Inc., 514 So. 2d 958, 961-62 (Ala. 1987) (finding no
genuine issue of material fact where the plaintiff could have known of relevant facts at the time
of his deposition); Williams v. Logan County Coop. Power & Light Ass’n, 594 N.E.2d 195, 197
(Ohio Com. Pl. 1991) (holding that “memory gap affidavits” do not create a genuine issue of
material fact).
137. See, e.g., Rohrbough v. Wyeth Lab., 916 F.2d 970, 975 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting the
contradictory affidavit’s questionable timing in answering the motion for summary judgment);
Martin v. City of New York, 627 F. Supp. 892, 896 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that summary
judgment is not defeated by submission of an affidavit by plaintiff’s mother contradicting both
her own and the plaintiff’s prior testimony).
COX.DOC 10/30/00  8:45 AM
2000] THE SHAM AFFIDAVIT DOCTRINE 291
specious denials, and sham defenses—is served by a rule that
prevents a party from creating issues of credibility by allowing one
of its witnesses to contradict his own prior testimony.138
Other courts, however, have allowed offsetting affidavits from
nonparties to be considered in summary judgment motions, even if
they contradict prior deposition testimony.139 The Eleventh Circuit
explained its reasoning for allowing such testimony:
Here there is little chance of sham factual issues. [The expert] is a
disinterested witness and it is our view that any inconsistency in his
testimony is more likely the result of his faulty memory than a
predisposition to lie. Thus, while a district court may find that a
party’s contradictory affidavit constitutes a sham, we would be
unable, absent great trepidation, to affirm a similar finding with
respect to a disinterested witness’ contradictory affidavit.140
The sham affidavit doctrine is based on functional concerns, and
the same functional concerns can arise whether the contradicting
witness is a party or a nonparty to a lawsuit. The conclusion reached
by the Seventh Circuit, therefore, appears correct. When the
nonparty is completely detached from the lawsuit, courts could rightly
determine that an offsetting affidavit was not introduced simply to
defeat the summary judgment motion and preserve the claim. Trial
judges should consider each offsetting affidavit submitted by a
nonparty separately, rather than adhering to a general rule that
prohibits their consideration.
IV.  BACKSTOPPING THE SHAM AFFIDAVIT DOCTRINE
Most federal and state courts have adopted an approach toward
offsetting affidavits that is consistent with the applicable rules of civil
procedure. Nevertheless, certain reforms would assure that disposing
of sham affidavits is proper in certain circumstances. Those reforms
include modifying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to address
138. Adelman-Tremblay v. Jewel Cos., 859 F.2d 517, 521 (7th Cir. 1988) (quotations and
citations omitted).
139. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Texas Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 919 F. Supp. 1031,
1037 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (explaining that a court must consider all of the evidence before it in
deciding a summary judgment motion); Kunzman v. Enron Corp., 902 F. Supp. 882, 896-98
(N.D. Iowa 1995) (allowing the introduction of an affidavit that contradicted previous
deposition testimony from someone other than the affiant).
140. Lane v. Celotex Corp., 782 F.2d 1526, 1530-31 (11th Cir. 1986) (citations and emphasis
omitted).
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problems raised by offsetting affidavits and increasing reliance on the
sanctions authorized by Rule 11 to deter fraudulent representations.
Implementing these suggestions would codify the approach already
adopted by many federal and state courts and eliminate any
remaining uncertainty regarding the justifications for the sham
affidavit doctrine.
A. Revising Rule 56
A revision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 would provide
federal judges still skeptical of the sham affidavit doctrine with a
textual instruction to disregard certain offsetting affidavits. Such a
revision would not be unprecedented. Since its adoption in 1937, Rule
56 has been amended three times—in 1946, 1963, and 1987. Two of
these three amendments allowed for increased utilization of summary
judgment.141 Revising Rule 56 to incorporate the sham affidavit
doctrine would effect a similar improvement.
The current version of Rule 56 allows courts to sanction parties
who present affidavits “in bad faith or solely for the purpose of
delay.”142 Rule 56(g) could be modified not only to allow for the
possibility of judicial sanctions, but also to allow judges to ignore
offsetting affidavits that raise only sham issues.143 While determining
the exact language of the new textual provision might be problematic,
this revision would conclude the debate over whether Supreme Court
decisions like Anderson actually justify the sham affidavit doctrine.144
Moreover, since most states pattern their rules of civil procedure on
the federal model,145 many would presumably follow the federal lead
in recognizing the explicit problems posed by offsetting affidavits. A
new version of Rule 56 would not lead to complete unanimity, but it
would certainly assure federal courts already so inclined that
disregarding sham affidavits is the correct disposition.
141. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s notes.
142. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(g).
143. This revision would answer James Joseph Duane’s concern regarding rule construction.
Duane argues that since Rule 56(e)’s “fairly unambiguous language” contains no requirement
that affidavits be consistent with all the witness’s statements, that requirement should not be
imputed into the other provisions of the rule. Duane, supra note 24, at 1601-02.
144. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
145. See 1 WILLIAM W. BARRON & HON. ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE §§ 9.1-9.53, at 46-80 (Charles Alan Wright ed., 1960).
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B. Increasing Reliance on Rule 11
In addition to, or instead of, revising Rule 56, federal courts
could impose Rule 11 sanctions on parties and on attorneys who
submit sham affidavits to the court. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11(b) provides that by presenting a “pleading, written motion, or
other paper”—unquestionably including affidavits—to the court, the
attorney essentially certifies that the document is submitted to the
court for a proper purpose.146 Rule 11(c) then provides federal courts
with the authority to sanction those who violate these provisions,
even on the court’s own initiative:
If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may,
subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate
sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated
subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.147
Although sanctions under Rule 11 are “limited to what is
sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct
by others similarly situated,”148 attorneys who submit sham affidavits
to cause unnecessary delay could face hefty fines. The deterrent effect
on the submission of other sham affidavits would be uncertain,
especially in state courts, but it is reasonable to suggest that the fear
of significant financial penalty would discourage attorneys from
advising their clients to contradict, without good reason, a deposition
admission with an offsetting affidavit.
Few trial judges have assessed sanctions against litigants who
manufacture issues of fact to avoid summary judgments,149 but courts
146. Specifically, the rule requires that:
(1) [the document] is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
147. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2).
148. Id.
149. But see Margo v. Weiss, 213 F.3d 55, 65 (2d Cir. 2000):
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have recognized their powers under Rule 11 to do so.150 Attorneys,
moreover, have been found liable under Rule 11 for submitting sworn
statements that blatantly contradict the evidence already on file. In
one federal case in Texas, the court assessed a $5,000 fine against an
attorney who submitted a disclaimer in which he stated that the
plaintiff’s minor children had no financial interest in the plaintiff’s
pending lawsuit.151 In a previous deposition, though, the plaintiff had
acknowledged that her children stood to collect a large amount of
money if she prevailed at trial.152 The court soon reached the
“inescapable conclusion” that the attorney had attempted to create
the appearance of diversity jurisdiction by refusing to name the
nondiverse minors as plaintiffs and had concealed their identities
from the court when he realized their presence as parties would
defeat diversity jurisdiction.153 The federal judge refused to tolerate
this conduct, holding: “The minimum standards of this noble
profession were not maintained but were subverted for improper
purpose.”154
It was objectively unreasonable for plaintiffs’ counsel to file affidavits, delayed
deposition errata sheets and supplemental interrogatory answers in which the
plaintiffs contradicted their earlier deposition testimony and interrogatory answers.
As the district court observed, there was no basis whatsoever upon which plaintiffs’
counsel could argue that this Court might read or change the Perma Research rule in
a way that rendered it inapplicable to such tactics. The district court acted well within
its discretion in granting the defendants reimbursement for a portion of their
attorneys’ fees to compensate them for the waste of the court’s and counsel’s time.
150. See, e.g., Richardson v. Bonds, 860 F.2d 1427, 1433-34 (7th Cir. 1988) (suggesting that
the submission of sham affidavits in response to a summary judgment motion came “perilously
close” to violating Rule 11); Selsor v. Callaghan & Co., 609 F. Supp. 1003, 1010 n.8 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (finding a direct contradiction of previous deposition testimony could be grounds for Rule
11 sanctions); McCullough v. Spitzer Motor Ctr., Inc., No. 64465, 1994 WL 24281, at *7 (Ohio
Ct. App. Jan. 27, 1994) (allowing the use of Rule 11 sanctions to deter the filing of a false
affidavit).
151. See Hearld v. Barnes & Spectrum Emergency Care, 107 F.R.D. 17, 19-20 (E.D. Tex.
1985).
152. See id. at 18-19.
153. Id. at 19.
154. Id. at 19-20. The federal judge hesitated to assess a penalty under Rule 11, as the
opinion reflected:
The Court admits to a measure of reluctance in coming to grip with the questions
raised by Plaintiffs’ counsel’s conduct. [Counsel] is well known to the Court. He has
appeared in numerous matters at both trial and pre-trial levels and has, to date,
comported himself with the highest standards of the legal profession from both a
competency and ethical standpoint.
Id. at 19.
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Since “an affidavit is a sworn document, declared to be true
under the penalties of perjury,”155 persons submitting sham affidavits
face possible criminal prosecution if they mislead the court.156 This
threat, combined with an increased reliance on Rule 11, could
eliminate many of the problems posed by sham affidavits in federal
courts. While assessing sanctions would not do away with all sham
affidavits, such sanctions would deter persons from attempting to
maintain their claims through an improper procedural mechanism.
CONCLUSION
Though it has escaped attention from all but a few legal
commentators, the sham affidavit doctrine has emerged as an
important aspect of summary judgment practice, both in federal and
state courts. Judges have generally handled the problems presented
by offsetting affidavits equitably, evaluating each submission on its
own merits. Instead of adopting an unyielding stance to offsetting
affidavits, courts should allow persons to overcome the presumption
against offsetting affidavits with reasonable explanations. If the
affiant cannot explain discrepancies with previous deposition
testimony on the basis of confusion, new evidence, or another
legitimate excuse, only then should the court disregard the affidavit as
a sham. Reaching such a determination coincides with judges’
responsibility to allow only genuine issues of material fact to reach
juries, as emphasized by the Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson.
Modifying Rule 56 or imposing sanctions pursuant to Rule 11
would solve many of the problems posed by the sham affidavit
doctrine, especially in federal courts. When correctly applied, the
sham affidavit doctrine serves both policy and procedural ends, as the
D.C. Circuit explained in 1991: “[T]he cases resting summary
judgment on sworn but repudiated party assertions reflect both a
judicial insistence that parties proceed with real care in their
supporting affidavits or testimony and a belief that parties’
opportunism should not readily imperil summary judgment.”157
155. 11 MOORE ET AL., supra note 26, § 56-14[1][b]; see also Smith v. Ashley, 332 N.E.2d 32,
34 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (holding that by disregarding sham affidavits, the court enforced “a
judicial policy, the purpose of which is to eliminate the temptation to commit perjury”); Meier v.
Pocius, 150 N.E.2d 215, 216 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958) (“Plaintiff having sworn, deliberately and
repeatedly . . . should not now be invited to commit perjury and change his testimony upon the
trial of the case or so reconstruct it as to avoid the consequence of his deposition.”).
156. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(g).
157. Pyramid Sec., Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc., 924 F.2d 1114, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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Accepted by every federal circuit that has considered the issue and a
large number of state courts, the sham affidavit doctrine preserves the
central purpose of summary judgment while allowing respondents to
such motions all reasonable inferences. The doctrine represents a
reasoned approach to a complex problem of civil procedure.
